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Survey Design: 
• Structure of survey questionnaire:  
preference to participate in carbon 
sequestration, socio-economic 
background and attitude to climate 
legislation, and current production 
practice. 
• Versions of survey questionnaire:  
6 different versions corresponding to 
6 levels of carbon prices ranging from 
$5 to $70 per metric ton.
• Sample sizes: 500 for each version 
of questionnaire with a given carbon 
price
• Survey administration: a random 
sample of 3000 farmers in the USDA 
ND Agricultural Statistic Service 
database selected  
Research Objective
• Investigate farmer preference to carbon 
sequestration potential under cap-and-trade.  
• Examine the production cost impact of carbon 
pricing due to cap-and-trade.
• Simulate acreage enrollment in carbon 
sequestration, carbon supply, and the impact of 
cap-and-trade on farm income  and its 
distributional effect. 
Assessing the Agricultural Impact of Cap-and-Trade: 
Research Framework
Policy Background and Motivation
• Pending cap-and-trade climate legislation – The 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.
• Co-existence of both opportunity and challenge 
for agriculture.
• Divided view and debate on the net impact of 




• stated preference approach
• reduced production cost function
• statistical simulation
• Modeling tool: Matlab programming
Research Challenges and Issues
• Farmer production behavior
Farmers might not be willing to tradeoff the 
potential revenue from carbon sequestration with 
restrictions on production management over a 5 
year period and transaction costs. 
• Farmer capacity of adaption
While cap-and-trade can increase prices for 
energy-intensive inputs, farmers may adjust 
production practice to mitigate the production cost 
impact.  
• Heterogeneity in farmer and distribution effect of 
cap-and-trade
Some farmers may gain and others may lose, 
depending on farming attributes. 
Farmer Behavior Model
Preference to Carbon Sequestration
• Assumption: farmers tend to maximize their profits
• Derived Kuhn-Tucker condition: farmers would participate in carbon 
sequestration only if the benefit is greater than farmer perceived costs.
• Empirical Specification: 
Probability (carbon sequestration) = binomial logit
• Data for Empirical Estimation: farmer stated preference survey
Adaption to Manage Production Cost
• Economic Production Theory:
• Production cost function: production cost is a function of output 
quantity and input prices.
• Farmer adaption: profit-maximizing farmers will adjust production to 
reduce their production costs as relative input prices change.
• Hypothesis:
• Variable production costs are an implicit function of energy prices 
(given that agriculture production is energy intensive in terms of input).
• Variable production costs are a non-linear function of energy prices 
(due to farmer adaption).
• Empirical Specification: Variable production costs per unit land are a 
quadratic function of energy prices.
• Data for Empirical Estimation: state level variable production costs, 
acreage of cropland in active production, and energy prices (1945-2008).
Some Caveats
• The study did not consider the effects of higher commodity prices and 
increased demand for bio-energy feedstock.
• Simulated ex ante carbon revenue based on farmer stated 
preference might underestimate ex post actual carbon revenue after 
cap-and-trade climate legislation becomes effective.
• Production cost impact of cap-and-trade might be underestimated as 
well since the effect of GHG emission regulation on prices for non-






























































Age less than 45 years 
Age 45-60 years
Age greater than 60 years
Farming experience less than 10 years
Farming experience 10 to 20 years
Farming experience greater than 20 years
Farming as major income
Some college or beyond
Concerned on climate change
Supporting climate legislation
Currently in carbon sequestration
Would participate  Would  not participate 
Survey Result:
• No. of usable returned 
survey = 281
• farmer distributions by 
attributes between 
participation and not 
participation
Farmer Preference to Carbon Sequestration Survey
Simulated Agricultural Impact of Cap-and-Trade 
Climate Legislation
Note: Marginal production costs were estimated based on 2009 ND production cost for different carbon 
prices and may vary depending on the base year production cost.   
Aggregate Margin Production 
Cost v.s. Carbon Revenue 
Cumulative Distribution of 
Marginal Profits by Farms
(Fertilizer Industry Exempted)
Cumulative Distribution of 





































































Carbon Price, $/metric ton carbon
Carbon squestration revenue
Marginalproduction cost  
(fertilizer industry exempted)
Marginalproduction cost  
(fertilizer industry caped)


















































  I: Carbon price = $5/metric ton
 II: Carbon price = $25/metric ton
III: Carbon price = $45/metric ton
IV: Carbon price = $65/metric ton

















































  I: Carbon price = $5/metric ton
 II: Carbon price = $25/metric ton
III: Carbon price = $45/metric ton
IV: Carbon price = $65/metric ton
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